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Introduction

A

T MIDNIGHT ON 2 OCTOBER 1990 the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) ceased to exist. The following day the armed forces of the Federal

Republic of Germany, the Bundeswehr, took control of the personnel, equip
ment, and installations of what had been the National People's Army (Nationale
Volksarmee or NVA). By any reckoning this was a massive undertaking and
one of great historical significance. It was massive because of the sheer amount
of equipment, ammunition, and acreage for which the Bundeswehr found itself
responsible in the new federal states, and it was historic because soldiers who
had faced each other across a deep ideological divide for over thirty years would
now be serving together.
The six active divisions of the NVA, along with State Security and border
forces, had been stationed in some 3,300 installations, and the GDR's military
materiel legacy included 2,300 main battle tanks, 7,800 armored vehicles, 2,500
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artillery pieces, 100,000 wheeled vehicles, and 300,000 tons of ammunition. 1
Securing, inventorying, and disposing of this materiel was to be a major mission
for the Bundeswehr throughout its first years in the new states. Complicating
this mission was the almost immediate need to support the liberation of Kuwait
through materiel shipments and support of departing U.S.; units, the additional
responsibility to assist the Western Group of Soviet Forces in an orderly
withdrawal from German territory; and the longer-term requirement to reduce
the Bundeswehr's size by almost 30 percent.
Of more lasting significance, however, will be the human impact of the union
of the two Germanys. It is difficult to predict how this will play itself out, as
these two societies seek to become one. The people of the new states have gone
through a roller coaster of emotions since refugees from the GDR first began
seeking asylum in West German embassies in East Berlin, Budapest, and
Prague in July of 1989, beginning the process that would lead to the "Turning
Point"

(die Wende) in German history. Since then the East Germans have

experienced the fear and exultation of those October and November days when
they chanted "We are the people" in Leipzig, Berlin, and elsewhere, as well as
the euphoria of unification, and they continue to experience the uncertainty of
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their economic future and a sense of second-class citizenship. If the changes
for West Germans have not been as dramatic, the effects have certainly been
felt intensely.

In the midst of the changes wrought by unification, the Bundeswehr took
on missions for which its origin and history had uniquely qualified it. First, there
was the self-imposed requirement to select former NV A officers and noncom
missioned officers who requested active duty in the Bundeswehr and then train
them to assume the functions of leaders in the armed forces of a democratic
society. Second, the Bundeswehr would have to build legitimacy for the armed
forces among an East German population that had learned to distrust the
military. The concepts of Innere Fuehrung, or "Inner Leadership," which had
stood the Bundeswehr in good stead in similar endeavors at its beginning and
throughout its short history, were used again to meet these new challenges.
This paper describes some of the ways these concepts aided in facilitating
the dual processes of the integration of former NVA officers and noncommis
sioned officers into the Bundeswehr and the acceptance of the military in the
new German states. It begins with a brief analysis of the concepts and their
perceived strengths and weaknesses. It describes the essential differences
between the Bundeswehr and the NVA leadership philosophy, political educa
tion, and outlook and also the impact the revolutionary political changes of the
Turning Point and the consequent reunification had on both of these armies.
After a brief discussion of the legacy of the NV A, this study describes how the
concepts of Innere Fuehrung were applied to combat that legacy, the challenges
faced in this endeavor, and prospects for the future.
The thesis of this paper is that, despite their flaws and shortcomings, the
principles of Innere Fuehrung played a key role in the early development of
the Bundeswehr as an army in a democracy and in its acceptance by the civilian
populace of the Federal Republic of Germany, and that these principles have
promoted the same processes in the new Gennan states. Although the NVA was
not the anny the Bundeswehr thought it was facing during the years of the Cold
War, its true legacy is being sunnounted by leaders well-versed in Innere

Fuehrung. Grave problems remain, however. A sensitive application of the
concepts of Innere Fuehrung can help solve some of these problems, and, in
fact, some of them mirror issues from the Bundeswehr's own history, while
others, such as the economic conditions in the new states that adversely affect
soldiers and civilians alike, are not amenable to correction by the military alone
and therefore have the potential to undo the successes of the early pioneers to
the East. The Bundeswehr can certainly lay claim to one of the few success
stories of the unification, but the entire story has yet to be told.

2
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IKE OTHER GERMAN WORDS that describe a whole complex of

philosophical ideas, Innere Fuehrung has no adequate, concise English

translation. Donald Abenheim, in what has become the standard work on the
history of the development of the concept in both German and English,
describes it as "... military leadership appropriate to the modem world, which
enables the soldier to carry out his mission while assuring his rights as a citizen

... [It is the] attempt to reconcile the citizen with the soldier, and to overcome
the traditional antagonism between democracy and the military in German
history 2
...

The need for such a concept became evident when, following the
demilitarization of West German society after World War II, the leadership of
the fledgling Federal Republic of Germany came under pressure to provide
armed forces for the common defense of western Europe. The Allies had
decided at Potsdam in August of

1945

that "the German educational system

must be supervised so that Nazi and militaristic precepts are eliminated com
pletely

.

.

.

...

3 The aims of the occupation forces matched the natural inclination

of the German population so well that in

1954

Paul Sethe could write in the

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:
The military tradition of the Gennans was broken off in

1945. In the nine years

since, memories and sentiments have become overwhelming among young

people that make it difficult to link up with this heritage Two lost wars [caused]
.

their terrible casualties; great parts of our cities will remain in rubble for long to
come; the appeal to idealism and a sense of sacrifice have been brutally abused

and arouse today only bitterness among many; the long struggle of the occupiers

against Gennan soldierly pride has not been without effect; the division of
Gennany paralyzes many.4

The challenges that faced the founders of the federal armed forces were to
overcome this distrust of all things military, which was a legacy of the military's
misuse by the National Socialist regime, and to provide a raison d'etre for
military forces in a democracy that would confer legitimacy on them in a
modem pluralistic society. At the same time, they recognized that new concepts

The Newport Papers
of professionalism and leadership were needed within the military in order to
protect the state and the individual soldier from the excesses of a reactionary
military elite. In short, they were faced with the problem of the proper ordering
of the military within their democratic society.
This was not and is not today a peripheral question. As Samuel Huntington
has noted: "The ordering of its civil-military relations

.

.

.

is basic to a nation's

military security policy. The objective of this policy on the institutional level
is to develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military
security at the least sacrifice of other social values 5 In other Western
...

democracies the development of these relations, the growth of a military
tradition supporting democratic social values, and the evolution of an officer
corps that embodies ideals necessary to sustain these values in a military
environment have generally taken place over an extended and unbroken nation
al history. Even when controversy arises, it does so within the context of a
general understanding of the utility of the armed forces and their proper place
in society.
In the 1950s the founders of the Bundeswehr faced the problems of defining
these relations without benefit of history; of discovering a tradition that would
encourage their proper development; and of providing leaders, most of whom
would come at first from a military with anti-democratic roots, with the tools
and the will to support the social values necessary for the proper functioning of
a military within a democracy. They would have to do all of this in the glare of
publicity and through dialogue with a public which, for the most part, had no
desire to face the questions it was being asked.
As early as 1948, upon drawing the necessary conclusions from the Berlin
blockade, the United States began to consider with seriousness the need for
German rearmament. Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer recognized the
need for a common Western defense and understood as well that armed forces
were part of a nation's claim to sovereignty. The chancellor originally thought
that any new German troops would be part of a pan-European defense force,
the European Defense Community. This idea died in 1954, but well before then
Chancellor Adenauer and his advisors had recognized that German forces,
whether part of a European force or independent, would need to be accepted
6
by the German public as well as hy the Western AHL:s.
The concepts of Innere Fuehrung were developed along with the organiza
tional and operational plans for the armed forces during the 1950s and early
1960s in a series of meetings, seminars, and position papers. While a number
of people, who included former Wehr macht officers, academics, and
politician'>, worked on the conceptualization of these ideas over the years,
Innere Fuehrung became most closely associated in the public's mind with
4
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Wolf Graf von Baudissin. Baudissin, who was a former Wehrmacht officer,
provided some of the earliest input for the concepts that would become Innere
Fuehrung, and he became its chief advocate, especially among civilians.7
While the Federal Republic's constitution or "Basic Law" had to be amended

to address the requirements of the armed forces, and separate legislation was
enacted to clarify the legal position of the soldier, the basis for the concept of
lnnere Fuehrung was stated in the first article of the Basic Law as it was written

in 1949: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall
be the duty of all state authority .. 8 This personal dignity is not lost when one
.

becomes a soldier. The soldier retains the rights of a citizen, narrowed only as
necessary to carry out his military duties. The soldier is a "citizen in uniform"
(Staatsbuerger in Uniform). Although not a revolutionary concept for an

American soldier, the idea of treating a soldier as a citizen was a key agent for
change in a military tradition which, while it had developed superb fighting
men, had also subjected them to the harsh, often meaningless discipline of the
drill square.9 As Theodor Blank, first Minister of Defense of the German
Federal Republic, said: "Whoever is unable, as an officer, NCO, or reserve
officer to impart his military skills and knowledge to recruits without treating
. 0
them as free citizens will have no place with us .. 1
The soldier also "has the duty to serve the Federal Republic of Germany

loyally and to defend courageously the rights and freedom of the German
people...II He must acknowledge and accept the principles of democracy as
expressed in the Basic Law and dedicate himself to their preservation. 12 These
principles include civilian control of the military (Primat der PoUtik). Further
more, the soldier is not to follow orders which assault human dignity or would
otherwise be illegal.13 This places the responsibility on the soldier to keep
himself informed, so as to be in the position to think critically about the orders
he receives and act accordingly. The soldier is to be treated as a thinking
indi vidual, worthy of respect, and capable of understanding the purpose behind
an order. Indeed, he must understand its purpose if he is to carry out his duties

as a soldier in a democratic society. This understanding goes beyond knowing
how to complete a military mission and showing initiative in carrying it out,
attributes which German soldiers displayed in pre-Bundeswehr armies. It

includes the soldier's understanding of the moral and social consequences of

his actions. Theodor Blank again expressed it best: "Democracy can be
defended only by democrats, and freedom only by those who experience it
themselves ...14
Baudissin wished to embed the soldier firmly in the democratic society and

to leave as little as possible in the purely military sphere. The plan was to keep
uniforms simple, with little in the way of medals and ribbons, and to keep

5
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ceremonies and parades to a minimum. Military tradition was a thorny matter,
because although as Samuel Huntington has noted, " ...civil-military relations
[in Germany] between 1871 and 1914 reflected an extraordinary degree of
obj ective civilian control and military professionalism founded upon a high
level and restricted scope of military authority ... ,',15 the armed forces'
political manipulations during and after the First World War and their cul
pability in the National Socialist regime hardly furnished material for the
tradition of an army in a democratic society.
Traditions worthy of study and emulation were eventually found. These
included the heroes of the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon and the General
Staff officers who conspired to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944. However,
these latter were not uncontroversial, and the whole question of what constitutes
a valid tradition for the German armed forces still remains open today. 16 It
should be noted that the leadership's decision that the Reichswehr and
Wehrmacht had no traditions worthy of being honored by the Bundeswehr did
not cause their memory to wither away, and this problem must be kept in mind
when addressing the legacy of the

NVA.

Although problems with tradition are only one of its shortcomings, Innere
Fuehrung did in fact, especially during the first years of the Bundeswehr,
provide a framework within which the armed forces could grow. It gave them
a mission-the defense of the democratic society within the framework of

NATO,

which was acceptable to the German public, if not highly popular.

Indeed, this acceptance seemed to grow over time until, by the early 1980s, 80
percent of the population favored German membership in

NATOY Innere

Fuehrung also defined the rights and responsibilities of leaders and soldiers to
each other and to the society as a whole. It provided a humane and highly
effective leadership philosophy. And finally, it helped assure West Germans
that the armed services were under civilian control and were an instrument of
a democratic society.
In order to achieve acceptance, however, the armed services, through Innere

Fuehrung, have tied themselves so closely to civil society that they are some
times indistinguishable from it. This has opened them to conservative criticism
that argues that armed forces who have accepted the values of a society that
emphasizes personal, material prosperity, and who seek to avoid hard choices
in international affairs, no longer have the necessary military ethos. 18 That this
is not a peculiarly German concern is evident from the headline of an article by
Harry Summers in which he expresses the worry that "Humanitarian Missions
Could Signal Collapse of 'Fighting Spirit' .. for the U.S. armed forces. In the
article he quotes T. R. Fehrenback favorably that "by the very nature of its
mission, the military must maintain a hard and illiberal view of life and the

6
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world. Society's purpose is to live; the military's is to stand ready, if need be,
19
to die.,, Whether a society is described as being materialist or humane, it is
necessary to recognize a tension between a society and its military, which the
teachings of lnnere

Fuehrung may have glossed over.

This blurring of the distinctions between civil and military cultures may lead
to soldiers' viewing their service

as

more a job than a profession. In tenns of

Charles Moskos' institutional-occupational continuum of how militaries view
themselves, the Bundeswehr is well over to the occupational side of the
20
spectrum. This attitude is nurtured among the officers by a military university
system that does not teach military science and does not require students to wear
21
uniforms, and by a conscription system that does not require them to serve
far from home. Many conscripted soldiers sleep at home and come and go from
22
duty "just like civilian employees.,, While most officers and senior noncom
missioned officers of the Bundeswehr have developed a professional view of
themselves and their duties, most of the junior noncommissioned officers and
soldiers retain a "nine-to-five" attitude that does not mesh well with the
requirements placed on modem military establishments.
Effective training is needed if

lnnere Fuehrung

is to be functional and, in

actuality, the training available is largely inadequate. The courses in social
science and education, which are provided by the military universities in
Hamburg and Munich, are supposed to provide officers with the wherewithal
to lead and train "citizens in uniform" effectively but are often considered
make-work courses that get in the way of the officer-student's work in his major
23
Political education is a command responsibility in the troop

area of study.

units, and soldiers are to receive twelve hours per quarter of instruction covering
such topics

as

"Parliamentary Democracy," "The Bundeswehr in State and

Society," "the Bundeswehr within the Alliance," and "Other Social Systems,"
but a 1979 study found that training was often canceled, not adequately
24
Under

prepared, and not always conducted by the company commander.

normal conditions it is difficult for commanders to fit such training into
schedules already crowded with normal duty and combat training requirements,
and in the experience of at least one senior officer who served as deputy
commander of a new home defense brigade in Brandenburg, in the early months
after unification it was almost impossible to meet the formal requirements for
political awareness training among the troops in the East, although informally
25
a great deal of this was happening.
Possibly the harshest criticism of

lnnere Fueh rung

from the Left, and the

least deserved, has been that it was essentially a hate campaign that used a
distorted picture of the enemy as all things evil

(Feindbild)

to motivate the

soldier. Such criticism sometimes more betrayed the critic's wishful thinking

7
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about benign developments in the German De mocratic Republic than
demonstrated the plausibility of any conscious attempt on the part of the
Bundeswehr leadership to distort the thinking of impressionable soldiers. Thus,
in 1970, Siegfried Grimm took the armed forces to task for teaching soldiers
that the GDR was a creature of the Soviet Union's political and strategic needs;
that its leaders had no personal legitimacy; and that these unscrupulous leaders
ruled through force and terror. He felt such oversimplifications disregarded the
large part of the population which, while not supporting communist domination
entirely, did support the structural changes to society that had occurred in the
GDR since

1945. If people did want change, they did not want capitalism but

merely a reform of the system. In any case the leadership had gained legitimacy,
as it allowed citizens to take greater part in the decision-making process, and
moreover, "... the economic growth in recent years has greatly changed the

picture of the GDR

... 26

Information presented to the troops in Bundeswehr literature and in training
may have been simplistic-though it does seem to have described with greater
accuracy conditions across the inter-German border than did its critics-but
such information was not used to train soldiers to hate their opponents. In fact,
the very absence of a view of the enemy as an evil entity may have been the
single most effective element of lnnere Fuehrung in facilitating the Bundes
wehr soldiers' acceptance of former NVA personnel into their ranks.

8

27

The Bundeswehr and the NVA

ESPITE ITS

D

PERCEIVED an d some very real shortcomings, lnnere Fueh

rung pro vided a f oundation for the military in German society for almost

forty years, and it played an essential role in making the Bundeswehr a very
different sort of military than the National People's Army. Born of the West's
need to have an all y against the Soviet Union and of G e rmany ' s to regain

sovereignty, the Bundeswehr was unique in comparison to other militaries as
well. As amended, the Basic Law provided armed forces for d efense; estab
lished a Defense Commissioner of the Bundestag, or p arliam entary ombudsman

(Wehrbeauftragter), to protect civil rights in the armed forces and to assist the
parliament in exercising civilian control o f the m ilita ry ; established a civilian
Administration of the Federal Armed Forces, which ma na ges administrative

and personnel matters often handled by uniformed p ersonn el in other militaries;
and severely limited the powers of military courts. It also laid out d etail ed
instructions that authorized civilian leaders to determine when the country faced

a threat that called for a military defense, at which time command of the military
28
would be transferred from the defense minister to the chancellor.
From the beginning, the country's poli tical leadership recognized that these
armed forces would act only in concert with their allies in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organiz atio n, and it also came to be accep ted that this military's real

mission was d e te rrence. It would be successful if it never actually had to fight
the war for which it was constantly preparing. Thanks in large measure to its

very success in this end e avor ,

as

well

as

to the antimilitarist sentiments of the

g enerat ions following the war, the Bundeswehr has faced recurring problems
of public acceptance, beginning with the "without me" (Ohne mich) attitude of
young men in the 1950s and e xt e nding through the attacks of the radicals in th e
sixties and the rearmament debate of the l ate seventies a nd e arly eighties.
Throughout all the public debate has run the fear that the military has not learned

its lesson and still threatens to become a state within a state . Aside from some
foolish actions on the part of individual military men and equally foolish
29
reactions in the press, there is little indication that this is a real threat. Across
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the inter-Gennan border, however, another Gennan anny was a key element of
a party organization that was in fact a state within a state.
The single most important thing to understand about the National People's
Anny is that, despite its name, it did not owe its loyalty so much to its people
or its nation as to the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands, or SED). The NVA had its beginnings in the Gennan People's
Police, which in the summer of 1948, at the behest of the Soviet Union, began
building so-called "garrisoned police" units. The leadership for the garrisoned
police came from the officer corps of the defeated Wehnnacht, as did the
original leadership for the Bundeswehr and by the end of 1950 there were over
70,000 personnel in these police units. They were trained and equipped as
military units so that when in January 1956 the Chamber of People's Deputies
of the GDR passed the "Law concerning the Creation of the National People's
Anny and the Ministry for National Defense," anned forces were already on
3D
hand.
When the Turning Point came in the fall of 1989, the NVA had an active
force of 170,000 soldiers, sailors, and ainnen. Like the Bundeswehr, it
depended on conscription, and young men were required to serve eighteen
months. Unlike the Bundeswehr, the NV A was part of a society which itself had
become regimented and militarized along the model of its Soviet big brother in
arms. Beginning in kindergarten, extending through "pioneer organizations"
for children between the ages of six and fourteen, and culminating in member
ship in the Free Gennan Youth and the Society for Sport and Technology, young
people were exposed to ideological indoctrination and training in basic military
31
skills. In 1976 the chainnan of the latter organization, a lieutenant general,
could say, "... nearly 95 per cent of all young men between 16 and 18 each
32
year take part in the Society's pre-military courses.,,
How effective the
training and indoctrination were is open to question, but it did bring service in
the NVA into the seamless whole of a world view shared by all the official
leaders and organizations of the society.
East Gennany's world view of itself was that of a state at the forefront of the
socialist revolution, in alliance with the Soviet Union and its other allies of the
Warsaw Pact, and envied and under attack by the reactionary forces of the West,
especially the Federal Republic of Gennany, which the East considered to be
the successor state to Hitler's Third Reich. Because of the early collaboration
of Gennan communist party members, such as Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm
Pieck, with the Soviet Union, and their subsequent coming to power in the GDR,
the leadership of the country could downplay the history of national socialism
and stress the GDR's connection to all the progressive aspects of Gennany's
history. Through this interpretation of history, the GDR and its social system
10
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became the ultimate goals of Gennan history, and anything that did not support
this view became a non-event.
This"world view" had the advantage of not forcing the citizens of the GDR
to confront the uncomfortable recent events in Gennan history, and it allowed
the NVA to make use of traditions the Bundeswehr would have found embar
rassing. Thus, while the Bundeswehr consciously sought to break with the past
in its selection of a modem, simple unifonn, the NVA's unifonn was strongly
reminiscent of the Wehrmacht's. While Baudissin sought to fmd republican
traditions among the Prussian refonners of the Wars of Liberation, the NVA
brought the Prussian generals into its pantheon en masse on their reputations
33

as military men who were part of the "progressive" tradition of the NVA.

In

July 1990 Lieutenant General Klaus Juergen Baarss, Deputy to the Secretary
of Defense and Disannament for Military Refonn, still defended what he
considered to be Prussian virtues, such as duty and honor, and Prussian features
34

in unifonns and ceremonies.

Such an understanding of history had the disadvantage that an unexamined
past allowed old attitudes and activities to live on in the new anned forces. The
introduction of Soviet military concepts of discipline and organization rein
forced these attitudes. The soldier's welfare was not his commander's primary
concern, and that famous first impression Bundeswehr officers had on their
visits to NVA installations, that the tanks were kept in heated bays while the
3S
soldiers lived in run-down barracks without showers or any other amenities,
had as much to do with the NVA's failure to overcome its past as it had to do
with the general poverty of the society. The abusive harassment of the old drill
square reemerged in the image of the "EK" system ("EK" is Entlassungskan

didat or "candidate for discharge"), an approach similar to the Soviet Anny's
in which the more senior conscript soldiers forced newer conscripts to work for
36
them and to do demeaning make-work jobs. This was allowed in the name of
discipline.
The acceptance of a world view of socialism under constant danger of attack
also lent itself to the sort of hate campaign the Bundeswehr was accused of
running. The NVA soldier swore not only to serve the GDR, but" ... to defend

socialism against all enemies and to stake my life for the achievement of
37
victory. ,, Thus, the enemy was not merely whoever infringed on the legitimate
security interests of the state-the enemy and the interests being subject to

change-but was a specific, unchanging social and economic class and its
lackeys.
In published materials and political education classes, NVA personnel were
told that in NATO they faced the strongest imperialist coalition in the world
and that the Federal Republic with its Bundeswehr was its spearpoint. The
11
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Bundeswehr was portrayed as a direct descendant of Gennan militarism: it
secured the power of the monopoly capitalist class within the Federal Republic
and planned to undo the results of the Second World War through a war of
aggression when the time was ripe. NV A soldiers were infonned that West
Gennan children were raised on a diet of nationalism, revanchism, and
anticommunism to prepare them for service as unthinking mercenaries in the
Bundeswehr, and that lnnere Fuehrung, along with pastoral care of soldiers,
prepared them psychologically and ideologically for th e war against
38

socialism.

Such NVA indoctrination went so far that in some units and branch schools
political officers set up rooms for "the political and psychological preparation
of soldiers for war." Along with flashing lights, taped sounds of combat, and
gruesomely realistic battle scenes, soldiers saw photo displays of the inequities
and violence of the capitalist system (e.g., starving children, unemployed
workers, strikes, riots) and of war scenes (e.g., Vietnam and Hiroshima).
Sometimes these rooms were separated, one having to do with the stress of war
(Stresskabinett) and the other dealing with only images of the enemy
39
(Feindbildkabinett).
There is some question as to how effective this fonn of indoctrination was.
The picture may have been painted so black that no one could accept it as
40
reality. NVA soldiers, as do soldiers in all armies, may have ignored subjects
that had little to do with their actual duties. It is difficult to believe, however,
that the constant reiteration of these themes did not have some effect. Fonner

NV A Rear Admiral Guenther Poerschel feels that the pictures and reports of
United States' military action in Korea, Vietnam, and the Near East played the
major role in validating one's choice of the military profession and that heavily
edited reports from the Western media, which emphasized NATO's strength
and were harshly critical of the socialist states, had a profound effect on those
41
If nothing else, the
who were constantly exposed to such indoctrination.
NVA's mission to protect and advance the cause of socialism legitimized the
anned services' close association with the Socialist Unity Party.

In the eyes of the East Gennan populace, the officers' association with the
Communist Party and their prior position.<; of leadership in "a privileged
42
institution of the SED ruled state,, are what make the rehabilitation of even
the small number of officers the Bundeswehr took over from the NV A so
difficult. Practically all NVA officers

(98 percent) were party members, as were

many of the noncommissioned officers (56 percent of the career noncommis
43
sioned officers).
They carried out political as well as military duties, and
failure to carry out a military duty could be considered a political transgression;
a political failing in tum could lead to loss of party membership and consequent
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career failure. Less than total support for the SED and its policies could lead to
dire consequences. For criticizing military intervention in Poland to put down
the Solidarity movement, Lieutenant Colonel Klaus Wiegand, a history instruc
tor at the Wilhelm Pieck Institute with twenty-five years of service, was
summarily degraded to the lowest enlisted rank and thrown out of the party. 44
For an officer, a career without membership in and support of the SED was
45
virtually unthinkable.
On the Soviet model, the party had parallel structures for the various levels
of the military hierarchy. The SED and the Free Gennan Youth had organiza 
tions down to the battalion level, and since soldiers came into the service out
of the youth movement, the majority of them remained members of it while in
46
As noted above, officers were expected to be members of the SED

unifonn.

and to take part in its activities. This career requirement has led to the present
rationalization among many fonner NV A officers that since everyone belonged,
membership is basically meaningless in detennining an officer's true beliefs.
One made the decision to be a professional soldier and officer out of the desire
to be in the military; party membership was merely a necessary condition of
47
this service.
This may be so, or it may be one of a number of examples of these officers'
attempts to rationalize their behavior in the light of what happened and what
they now know about the regime they served. In any case, some of the more
discerning of these officers note that, although membership was practically
automatic and at first essentially a passive acceptance of the state of affairs,
officers, especially the successful ones, tended to become functionaries in the
party organizations at their levels of command, thus becoming ever more
closely identified with the party and its aims as their careers progressed. By
grooming the best officers, especially those in the command track, for party
leadership, the SED achieved two objectives simultaneously: it identified the
best officers with the party and its goals in the minds of their contemporaries
and subordinates, and it provided an effective means for the party to control
48
Thus, whether a fonner NVA officer wishes to

those in leadership functions.

admit it or not, membership in the SED takes on a significance beyond simply
careerism.
The SED and youth organizations were organized in parallel to the military
apparatus. Within the military itself, party influence was represented by the
political officers, who were to be found at every level in the company. To view
these officers, of whom there were about 6,000 in the NV A, as being of the same
mold as the Red Anny commissars of the Russian Revolution and its attendant
civil wars would be inaccurate. They were of course, highly dedicated and did
work to indoctrinate the troops politically. Although these officers were
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subordinate to their commanding officers, they carried a great deal of leverage
in that they could always approach a political officer at a higher level of
command than their own commanding officer and request intervention that a
decision with which they disagreed be overturned. For that reason, and because
a political officer was always in a position to report a commander's mistake as
a party failing, commanders dealt very carefully with their political officers.
The commanders also, however, depended a great deal upon their political
officers.
Far more important than his political activities, as far as the commander and
the troops were concerned, the political officer in the NVA, as in other Warsaw
Pact countries, provided for the morale and welfare of the soldiers in his unit.
The political officer worked out the leave schedule. If a soldier was having
difficulties at home or had a financial problem, he went to the political officer,
and not to his commander, who was generally considered unapproachable.
Matters that in Western armies are considered command responsibilities and in
which U.S. Anny commanders at all levels are directly involved were relegated
to individual political officers at company level, and to political staffs at
49
battalion level and above.
Commanders were so dependent upon their political officers for the care of
their troops that, as communist regimes died in the Warsaw Pact, the political
officers underwent a slight metamorphosis and were kept on. They became
responsible for "civics" instead of political indoctrination; the names of the
schools where they were trained were changed (the Lenin Academy in Moscow
to the "Humanitarian Academy" and the Wilhelm Pieck Military and Political
Institute in Berlin to the "Institute for Civic Education"); and courses in
Marxism-Leninism disappeared in favor of the social sciences. But officers
with the duties of political officers, if not in name, have nonetheless remained
in the armies of all fonner Warsaw Pact countries, except the fonner GDR.
Russian Navy ships' captains have even been reported to refuse to leave home
port without their political officers. 50
Opinions differ as to whether these officers were political creatures who
otherwise would have been failures in the military or were the cream of the
crop, chosen precisely because of their intelligence and communications skills.
There is evidence that they were among the first to understand the impact of
the Turning Point on the NVA and to attempt to do something to bring the NVA
51
into step with its changing society. Whether these officers were good or bad,
it remains that the system insidiously integrated the SED, in the person of the
political officer, into the most important relationship of trust-that between the
commander and the soldier-consequently turning the soldier's loyalty toward
the party and away from his chain of command. The consequence for the leader,
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who had primarily to concern himself with the tactical mission and less with
the well-being of his troops, was alienation from his soldiers.
The NVA's leadership philosophy was patterned on the Soviet style of
leadership. Mission-type orders, in which the soldier is given a mission and
expected to use his own initiative to complete it, were not given; directives left
little to the commander's initiative, much less the noncommissioned officer's
or private soldier's. Part of this was due to a compartmentalized organizational
structure in which staff officers had direct access and command authority within
their competencies over their counterparts in subordinate staffs. There were
eighteen technical areas in which this "pipeline" leading past the commander
52
to his own subordinates existed, and the system led to a lack of flexibility and
initiative and to a swelling in the number of staff officers far beyond that of
Western armies in comparable organizations. These officers had very cir
cumscribed jurisdictions and often carried out duties performed by a noncom
missioned officer in the West, such as running a dining facility or a supply room.
Since rank was essentially only pay grade and was not associated with specific
duties or responsibilities, an officer could rise to senior rank and never change
his job. Whether one was a commander or a staff officer, the opportunities to
use one's own judgment and take independent action were few.
Whatever personal frustration individual officers may have felt within such
a system, the officer corps was a privileged class within the society. It received
priority for housing, a separate economy saw to its needs, and a system of
monetary rewards and bonuses boosted officers' salaries above those of their
53
Other advantages, such as early

contemporaries in the civilian economy.

retirement with a good pension, the opportunity upon retirement to cross over
to comparable employment in the civilian sector, and more frequent access to
state-run vacation resorts, all indicated the special status of the officer corps. 54
This privileged status was paid for, however, by near-total isolation from the
civilian community and from any source of information other than that provided
or approved by the state, and also by long duty hours, extreme readiness
requirements, and the knowledge that one's personal as well as one's profes
sionallife was subject to intrusive observation. Military families usually lived
in separate housing projects and were forbidden to watch West German
television or to have contacts with West Germans. Although the rest of the
population was not supposed to watch or listen to Western broadcasts either,
this ban was normally broken by the civilian population, while many former
NVA officers insist they felt duty-bound not to watch.

In any case, for an officer,

being caught conversing with information available only from the West, or
being reported by one of the many State Security (Stasi) informers for having
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watched or listened to Western broadcasts would mean the end of one's
55

career.

Bundeswehr leaders have been surprised at the number of Stasi informers
within the officer corps alone. It is estimated that up to 20 percent of those
selected for career or long-term service in the Bundeswehr will be forced to
resign, as separate investigations by the Gauck commission, charged with
56
examining all State Security files, uncover their connection with the StasL
The Stasi's Administration 2000, the organization responsible for monitoring
the NY A, had a formal presence down to the regimental level and informants
throughout the companies and platoons. Even a soldier who was not an
informant would feel the pressure to report infractions if someone else knew
he was aware of them, fearing that the other person might be an informer who
would lodge an accusation that the soldier did not report the incident. Electronic
eavesdropping was also widespread and was facilitated by the concentration of
officers in housing areas. Western observers were astonished at the complacen
57

cy with which such eavesdropping was accepted.

The housing areas also facilitated the NVA's high degree of readiness.
Eighty-five percent of the personnel of each unit in the NY A stood ready in the
barracks at all times. Officers not on duty on the installation could be alerted
by sirens in the housing areas and had to be in the unit within twenty minutes
of the alarms' sounding. All vehicles were kept topped off with fuel and under
full combat load of ammunition at all times, because the unit had to be able to
depart the installation within one or two hours; most units could quit their
barracks in less than the allotted time. Traffic signals were installed at the exits
from the motor pools to allow split-second traffic coordination. There is no
doubt that the NY A's ability to quit its installations on alert and reach its
assembly areas rapidly and in good order would have been difficult for the
Bundeswehr to duplicate, especially on a weekend or holiday, but this ability
exacted a heavy price.
The high degree of around-the-clock readiness meant little free time for
soldiers, noncommissioned officers, or officers. Leaves were carefully planned
and subject to last-minute cancellation should sickness or other absences reduce
the unit's personnel strength below 85 percent. It was difficult to keep the
soldiers gainfully employed with training and maintenance for such long
periods of time, and the boredom and close quarters probably encouraged the
harassment of young soldiers through the "EK" system. Moreover, since
NATO's attack would come at the least expected moment, special emphasis was
placed on readiness on such holidays as Christmas, separating families while
58

soldiers waited for the attack that never came.
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Since NVA intelligence and thus the political and military leadership of the

GDR knew that NATO, and particularly the Bundeswehr, were neither planning
to nor were positioned to attack, there must have been other reasons for the
insistence on constant readiness. The obvious reason, besides the fact that the
Soviet forces insisted upon it, was that it was an integral part of the ideology.
Socialism was under threat of attack from the forces of capitalism, and no
sacrifice to protect it was too great. A more subtle reason is advanced by Frithjof
Knabe, who feels that it was equally important to occupy officers and men
totally with the day-to-day problems of maintaining readiness, so as to keep
them from questioning the system that demanded these sacrifices. S9 It is

certainly true that this emphasis on readiness perforce isolated the soldiers from
the populace, as did the parallel insistence on extreme secrecy, which kept the
installations closed to civilians and off the maps. Also, it facilitated the state's
control of the information the soldiers received. Once on the installation, the
troops were severed from all sources of information other than those sanctioned
by the state.
Two very different armed forces faced each other across the inter-German
border. One had made a conscious effort to deal, however incompletely, with
its past, and sought to be a part of the society that it defended. The other did not
come to terms with its past or with its position of privilege within its society.
The rapidity of events leading up to and following the fall of the Wall in
November 1989, which led to unification, caught both armies unprepared but
had their greatest impact on the army that had been cut off from reality for so

many years.
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The Turning Point
THE EIGHTIES WORE ON and Premier Gorbachev 's refonns took hold

in the Soviet Union, events there and in other Warsaw Pact countries,

especially Poland, began to raise questions in the minds of some NVA officers
about the future of the GDR and its armed forces. For some of them the moment
of truth seems to have arrived while attending the General Staff Academy in
Moscow; for those who had attended courses there in the seventies, the decay
of the system upon their return in the eighties was evident. In 1988 an NVA
officer's wife wrote home from Moscow that the GDR had no more than one

year left to exist. For others, the light of reality came with the NVA's role in

putting down the riots in Dresden in September 1989, which took place as the
trains with the East German refugees from the West German embassy in Prague
60
As the demonstrations

passed through on their way to the Federal Republic.

grew in scope and took on the character of a revolution that could bring down
the state, the NVA was placed in readiness for a so-called "Beijing solution." It
became a point of pride among NVA officers that it did not come to such a
solution, but there is a continuing debate about whether the NVA would have
61
fired upon German civilians if so ordered.
On 7 November 1989 the government of Egon Krenz, Erich Honecker's
successor of three weeks, resigned, and on 9 November the Berlin Wall was
opened. The professional soldiers of the NVA, officers and noncommiss ioned
officers, went through severe psychological shock as the regime to which they
had dedicated their lives, for which they had made substantial sacrifices of time
and effort, and not unimportantly, from which they had derived many privileges
and benefits, feU without a struggle. They experienced further shock when they
discovered that the Bundeswehr, against whose attack they had so long prepared
r
1

and because of which they had made these sacrifices, had never planned to

I

Compounding this severe blow to its morale and its understanding of itself,

•
1

attack and that the regime they had served loyally had consistently lied to them.
the leadership of the NVA was faced with the need to reform the armed services
immediately in order to bring them in line with a state governed by democratic
principles. Now the attempt had to be made to build a new relationship, without
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socialist, internationalist content, between leader and led, to ftnd a tradition that
62
supported "values like peace, freedom, and democracy, ,,
terms also now
devoid of socialist, internationalist content, and make the military palatable to
a newly empowered, anti-militarist citizenry. The logical source for information
on such matters was the Bundeswehr, but the armies dealt warily with each
other. Offtcial guidance concerning contact between the armed forces of the
63
two states did not go into effect until 1 June 1 990. Personal, unofftcial contact,
however, took place before that.

In May 1 990, while on leave and dressed in jeans and leather jacket, Colonel
Hans-Peter von Kirchbach appeared at an NV A installation in Dresden, showed
his Bundeswehr identiftcation, and requested entrance. Although this ftrst
encounter was met with hesitancy, the visit resulted in an exchange of cor
respondence, a plan to exchange visits of offtcers, and a request for a brieftng
on Innere Fuehrung from the staff offtcers of the 7th NV A Armored Division
64
in Dresden. Much earlier, in January 1 990, and at greater risk to himself, the
NVA political offtcer, Major Frithjof Knabe, had taken the overnight train from
Leipzig to Koblenz, placing his career and livelihood in the balance to search
for the outside ass istance he felt the NVA needed if it were to learn how to be
an army in a democracy.
Since he was part of a ftfty-man division of political offtcers on the staff of
a corps-sized military district, Knabe took it for granted that a Bundeswehr
corps would have an equivalent staff in its headquarters. In Koblenz he reported
to the headquarters of the III Corps of the Bundeswehr and was taken to the G2
(intelligence offtcer), who in tum sent him to the Center for Innere Fuehrung.
As he had always been taught that Innere Fuehrung was the training that made
soldiers amenable to manipulation by capitalists in their wars of aggression, he
was more than a little concerned about being trapped in the center responsible
for the dissemination of this doctrine. Knabe was surprised by the openness and
helpfulness with which he was greeted, and he returned by train to Leipzig that
night with a wealth of material and promises of assistance once he had digested
the information.
Upon reporting his contact with the B undeswehr to his superiors, Knabe was
relieved of duties and threatened with expulsion from the military. He fought
this action by building a "citizens' initiative" and by threatening the NVA with
adverse publicity. Members of this citizens' initiative and one of Knabe 's
superiors met with a small group of offtcers from the Center for Innere
Fuehrung in March at Knabe 's apartment. This was one of a number of
spontaneous attempts on the part of NV A offtcers to learn how to reform their
armed forces. Reforms were doomed to failure, however, because the leader
ship of the NV A did not change; it was precisely this leadership that had the
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greatest interest in protecting the status quo for as long as possible.

65

When the

generals and senior officers were not released from service following the GDR' s
first free elections on 18 March 1 990, and the new Minister for Disarmament
and Defense, Pastor Rainer Eppelmann, took no effective action, hopes for
66

meaningful change in the armed forces ebbed.

From its inception, the new free German Democratic Republic was seen as
a transition state to German unity . On 28 November 1 989 Chancellor Helmut
Kohl provided the Bundestag a ten-point program for German and European
unity. However, even optimists thought in terms of years of slow, deliberate
integration of the two states and that during this period a down-sized NV A would
provide a bridge to the Warsaw Pact armies. In April 1 990, Rupert Scholz
suggested a "step-by-step" integration process in the "mid-term" through which
the NVA first would leave the Warsaw Pact, then combine with non-NATO
Bundeswehr units, and possibly become part of a European multi-national
67
force.
At an NVA commanders' conference in Strausberg on 2 May 1 990,
Disarmament and Defense Minister Eppelmann said that as long as there were
two military blocs, the NVA must continue to exist in order to avoid a "military
68
vacuum" on the territory of the GDR.
Even as it became clear that unity was going to come more rapidly than
originally expected, the hope remained alive within the NVA that it would
somehow continue to exist as a separate entity, at least for a short time . As late
as August 1 990 Minister Eppelmann was still talking about a separate army in
69
There is precedent in German history

the new states, even after unification.

for annies becoming contingents of other armies rather than disbanding. It
happened extensively during the wars of unification after 1866 and 187 1 , and
noble officers in the armies of the German states prior to unification often
moved from army to army without giving up rank or pri vilege. This, however,
was before the age of id eology , and thoughts of retaining the NVA or units of
the NVA did not take into account that it had thoroughly discredited itself with
both the political leadership in Bonn and the East German civilian population.
The NVA had also become increasingly uncontrollable. Conscript service
was cut from eighteen to twelve months, civilian substitute service was intro
duced, readiness requirements were cut from 85 percent to 50 percent, and
soldiers took part in demonstrations and refused to carry out orders with which
70
Without the authority of the state and party, officers and
they disagreed.
noncommissioned officers were hard put to discipline their soldiers. Citizens '
initiatives were organized to challenge military authority, as the concept of an
"army in a democracy" was und erstood to mean a demo cratic army. Once it
became obvious that the Germanys would be unified in October 1 990, and
rumors that questioned the future of the NV A began to circulate, discipline
21
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became even more difficult to impose. By the time of unification, in the words
71
of one fonner NVA officer, the NVA was little more than "a band of robbers. "
There were officers who prided themselves on having maintained some fonn
of discipline and in handing over their units in good order to the new Bundes
wehr commanders, although even they were ashamed at the indiscipline of
72
many of their soldiers.
The leaders of the Bundeswehr were also caught unawares by the Turning
Point. According to Lieutenant General von Scheven, they were " . . . making
preparations for something completely different, namely improving their
conventional defense capabilities, maintaining their peacetime strength and
73
increasing their basic tenn of service from 1 5 to 1 8 months.'. Although in
mid-June Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic
of Gennany, had called for "one state-one anny," the leadership was still
thinking of Gennan unity in the long tenn and in any case had to refrain from
fonnal planning for unity due to its diplomatic sensitivity. Then on 1 6 July 1 990
Chancellor Kohl and Premier Gorbachev agreed on a fonnula which allowed a
united Gennany to remain in NATO, reduced the Bundeswehr to 370,000
troops, and cleared the way for almost immediate German unity and
74
sovereignty .
In a curious parallel to the speed with which the Bundeswehr
had had to develop in the 1 950s, cutting almost in half the six years that the

buildup was supposed to take, the Bundeswehr in 1 990 was faced with the

challenge of planning and beginning to execute its unprecedented mission in
7s
the East within less than three months.
Following discuss ion with his chiefs of staff and other military advisors,
Minister Stoltenberg laid down the guidelines for what was to happen after 2
October 1 990. The NV A was to cease to exist, and its soldiers would become

for the time being soldiers of the Bundeswehr, subject to the regulations and
federal laws under which it operated. The units of the NV A would stand down
to be replaced by Bundeswehr units made up of a mix of old Bundeswehr and
fonner NVA personnel. Approximately 20,000 career and long-tenn soldiers
(i.e., officers and noncommissioned officers) of the NVA could be accepted to
serve for two years in the Bundeswehr with the possibility of further service to
be determined at a later time. Draftees who had been called into the NVA on 1
September would be trained according to Bundeswehr standards. A provisional
joint command, the Bundeswehr Command, East would initially have com
mand and control of all anned forces in the new states and work directly for the
Minister of Defense, thereby keeping these forces outside the NATO command
structure, a prerequisite for troops serving in the new states until the departure
of all Soviet forces by 1 994. The commander of Bundeswehr Command, East
76

would be Lieutenant General Joerg Schoenbohm.
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A small liaison group from the Bundeswehr took up its duties with the GDR' s

Ministry for Disarmament and Defense on 20 September, to be followed after
reunification by 693 Bundeswehr officers, who essentially took over command

of NVA units down through division level. At least 30 percent of the commands
at battalion level were to be in Western hands, including at least one company

in each battalion. Although by this time the NVA had shrunk to approximately

103,000

soldiers (including

32,000

officers and

20,000

noncommissioned

officers), when one includes the key staff positions that had to be taken over by
Bundeswehr officers from the West, there were comparatively few Bundeswehr
officers for the number of positions to be filled. In some cases there was only

one West German officer in a unit.77 Although additional help, especially
noncommissioned officers, would later come from the West, the initial com

r

plement was kept small to avoid the im ression of a conquering occupation
force dispossessing the vanquished foe.7

Although they were volunteers, some of these officers had second thoughts
about working with former NVA officers, and in some cases first impressions

seemed to justify their misgivings?9 Their thoughts mirrored the internal debate

within the armed forces, which had been going on throughout the summer, about

the NVA and the nature of its soldiers. 80 If the officers of the Bundeswehr
thought they were going to meet automatons who had supported a communist
system out of deep conviction and would now need to be de-programmed, they

were mistaken. They soon found that the legacy of the NVA was something else
entirely.
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The Legacy of the NVA
3 OCTOBER the generals and admirals had already been dismissed from

the NVA, as had been the political officers. Officers over fifty-five years

of age had been allowed to retire. Then, too, many officers and noncommis
sioned officers who had truly been convinced of the rightness of their cause and
had no desire even to try to work with the Bundeswehr had already left as well.
What the first cadre of Bundeswehr personnel found among the personnel and

installations of the NYA and among the civilian population of the new German

states was the true legacy of the National People 's Army.
The run-down barrac ks with twenty-man bays, furnished with cots, narrow
lockers, and stools instead of chairs; the hoses and water buckets instead of
showers; the unhygienic latrines and kitchens, often co-located-all were
physical evidence of a system that treated the soldier as a cypher. The officers '
practice of addressing soldiers up through senior noncommissioned ranks with
the informal du was considered highly impolite in West German professional
"

"

circles, and the hang-dog. sullen attitude of the conscripted soldiers who had
begun their training under NYA standards testified as well to the system 's lack
81

of concern for personal dignity and worth.

The officers often lacked the basic elements of leadership expected of a
Bundeswehr officer. In a controversial article in Truppenpraxis, the com
mander of one of the new home defense brigades described his subordinates
from the

NYA

as ". . . soldiers, whose behavior was characterized by an

unknown mixture of trust in authority [and a] paralyzing lack of drive •

. . .

who

widely lacked initiative, elan and creative individuality. . . . They were in
doctrinated with the deterministic Marxist philosophy and told it was science.

This resulted in alarming educational deficits . . . of former East German Army

officers. 82 One may argue whether Colonel Millotat should have made these
..

remarks in so public a forum, but his observations coincided with the experience
83
and perception of others.
Nor is it difficult to understand that having served in a system that did not
reward. indeed would punish, the sort of traits Western armies look for in their
leaders, coupled with the psychological shock of having served a failed society
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and the need to adjust to a totally new set of rules of conduct would inhibit one's
initiative and willingness to experiment. It must also be remembered that in the
first months after unification, officers were waiting to see who would be
accepted for two years of service with the Bundeswehr, and therefore, until the
fall of 1 992, officers faced the much tougher selection for career or long-term
status. The pressure not to make mistakes in both of these periods was enor
mous.
Other legacies of the NVA among the soldiers were the "not my job"
mind-set, caused by the severe compartmentalization of duties and specialties,
a curious combination of lack of trust in the leadership, and the tendency to
believe rumors and whatever appeared in the newspaper-arising, to some
extent, from the absence of useful information from the chain of command
during the waning months of the regime and previous access to only certain
channels of information. There was also a tendency to train to "stopwatch"
standards: whatever could be timed was drilled, checked, and rewarded. This
attitude toward training and training standards probably arose from a zero

defects philosophy in an army where error could be punished by the party, as
well as by the military, and it led to outstanding performance in individual
soldier skill training and in the ability to react to alerts already described;
however, since the capacity to understand a commander's intent or to use
originality in handling a mission could not be timed or checked easily and could
lead to mistakes, these qualities were not inculcated in soldiers or leaders.
Consequently, there is some question as to whether the NVA accomplished

worthwhile training above the company level. 84

The legacy of NVA among the civilian population was equally unfortunate
and boded ill for the Bundeswehr's chances of securing support for the military
among the citizens of the new states. Having closed themselves in their
installations and housing areas away from the populace; having enjoyed visible
privileges such as easier access to automobiles, televisions, and other consumer
products; and having been perceived correctly as supporters of the SED and the
socialist state, professional military men had built a wall of antipathy and
resentment between the armed forces and the civilian populace, which the
85
Bundeswehr would have to break down. The decision to allow some officers
and noncommissioned officers from the NVA to remain in the Bundeswehr did
86
not help this process .
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The Challenges for Innere Fuehrung

I

N DIS CUSSING THE ROLE of Innere Fuehrung in the Bundeswehr's mission
in the new states, one must keep in mind that it addressed a number of

audiences. It had to address those in unifonn on 3 October 1990, especially
those in leadership roles; it had to deal with the attitudes and needs of the young
men in the new states who would be conscripted or recruited into the Bundes
wehr and those who would become its officers and noncommissioned officers;
and it had to come to tenns with the civilian population. Innere Fuehrung was
realized in two ways: first, through fonnal training at the Center for Innere
Fuehrung, in the troop or branch schools, and in the field; and second, through
the personal example provided by soldiers of the old Bundeswehr, who had
lived with the principles of Innere Fuehrung throughout their professional lives,
who honestly believed in them and their effectiveness in providing a compass
for the military in a democratic society and had internalized them to such a
degree that these principles informed their actions and attitudes.
Fonnal classes on Innere Fuehrung began in both the East and the West prior
to unification. Officers from the Center for Innere Fuehrung, in civilian clothes,
went east, and officers and senior noncommissioned officers of the NVA, in
unifonn, went west, as the attempt was made to teach at least the essentials of
87
Innere Fuehrung in forty-hour courses held at all of the branch schools. These
were carried on after 3 October 1990 with emphasis upon personnel in leader
ship positions. This was a rather chaotic time, because NVA officers were being
given the opportunity and being encouraged to leave the service with a small
severance payment or, if over fifty years of age, with a pension, in order to
reduce the number who would have to be involuntarily cut at a later date. About
60 percent of the 3 2,000 officers on hand on 3 October elected this option.
Thanks to the uncertainties caused by the resignations, the schools would
plan courses only to find that there were not enough officers left to support the
class, or bus-loads of officers would appear for classes that had not been
88
scheduled. The effort was made, however, because it was essential that the
former NVA officers and noncommissioned officers who remained on active
duty have some idea of the Bundeswehr structure, procedures, and discipline.
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The emphasis was on their understanding that a military in a democracy did not
mean a democratic military and that, although leadership styles were different,
89
leaders still had authority.
By the early spring of 1 99 1 , about 6,000 of the approximately 1 1 ,000 former
NVA officers who had requested to serve a two-year probation period in the
90
Bundeswehr were informed that their applications had been accepted. Those
who were not accepted left the service in the following months. Those accepted
had already experienced a reduction in rank (often as many as two pay grades)
in order to bring them into step with the Bundeswehr's promotion system, which
was a great deal slower than the NVA ' s had been. These officers could now
request consideration for professional status in order to remain in the service
indeftnitely. For these officers, much would depend on the single officer
efficiency report they would receive from their commanders the following
April, as well as on the fmdings of the independent Gauck commission, which
was searching for evidence of Stasi collaboration.
Officers in leadership positions and noncommissioned officers, the majority
of whose requests for two-year service status had been accepted because of the
shortage of noncommissioned officers in the new states, underwent "sup
plemental training," which consisted of courses at an officers' or noncommis
sioned officers ' school to bring them up to the level of leadership ability
corresponding with their ranks, courses at a branch school to become proftcient
with the duties required by their positions, and practical experience with their
sister units in the older states before returning for duty with their own com
mands. For fteld grade staff officers, however, this training consisted of a
91
two-week course on Innere Fuehrung and on-the-job training.
A typical course would begin with a n introduction to the principles o fInnere
Fuehrung, then concentrate on leadership for the next two days. Subjects
covered under the heading of leadership included leading through mission-type
orders and by example, providing for the welfare of the soldier, responsibility
for subordinates, the tension between individual freedom and duty accomplish
ment, group dynamics, views of oneself and of others, and interpersonal
communication. These officers were made familiar with their legal rights and
duties as soldiers through class es covering the constitutional basis for the
Bundeswehr, legal protections for the soldier (to include the parliamentary
ombudsman and complaint procedures) , the legal basis for giving orders and
what constitutes a legal order, and the responsibilities of a superior officer.
Finally, they learned the principles of political training in the Bundeswehr and
about the resource of counseling and care, which they had not had available to
them in the NV A. Much of this was done through practical exercises that forced
92
the officers to take positions, think about them, and defend them.
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In the new states, as time was found for political training in the units, it
consisted largely of instruction on how to get along and survive in the chaos of
democracy and capitalism. Here, former NVA company commanders were at
a disadvantage, because they knew no more about their new society than their
soldiers and had the added disadvantage of continually having to defend their
past service. Even after attending leadership and Innere Fuehrung courses,
officers and noncommissioned officers had difficulty understanding the prin
93
An after-action report for one of these

ciples and explaining them to others.

courses stated that the participants only half-heartedly adopted the principles
and aims of Innere Fuehrung and that their acceptance was based on the
94
pragmatic formula: "If it helps me, it's all-right.,, In any case, young soldiers
from old and new states did not like to serve under officers and noncommis
sioned officers of the old NVA .
Even i f some soldiers were having trouble grasping the formal lessons on
Innere Fuehrung, and even before things settled down enough in the units to
conduct political training, these soldiers were witnessing the principles of
Innere Fuehrung being lived by the soldiers who came from the old states. The
very decision to send so few soldiers from the West was based on a desire not
to insult the dignity and feelings of the officers and men of the old NVA any
more than was necessary, and this desire was rooted in the central principle of
Innere Fuehrung. The same was true of the decision of the Commander,
Bundeswehr Command, East, concerning the uniform. There were enough
fatigue uniforms to clothe everyone in his command, but not enough dress
uniforms. Lieutenant General Schoenbohm, with permission of the Minister of
Defense, ordered that all soldiers in the Bundeswehr East wear fatigues, to
include himself and his staff officers. From the very beginning, visibly at least,
there was to be no difference between soldiers of the old NVA and the old
95
Bundeswehr; there were to be no second-class soldiers.
NVA soldiers were repeated ly surprised by the openness and frankness of
the Bundeswehr soldiers. For an army who had conducted its business behind
closed doors and with highly formalized and rigid speech patterns, and whose
officers were inaccessible to the enlisted men, the informality and accessibi lity
of officers like Hans-Peter von Kirchbach and the commander of Bundeswehr
East himself, Lieutenant General Joerg Schoenbohm, came as a pleasant
surprise. This kind of working environment was encouraged within the Bun
deswehr and was repeated often, at many levels. Most Bundeswehr com
manders welcome questions from subordinates; if they have information, they
pass it on; if they do not, they say so, and soldiers usually have no fear of asking
tough questions or requesting assistance. This openness was a key asset for
96
Bundeswehr soldiers in dealing with their counterparts from the East.
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The openness extended to the public sphere and to people who had been
enemies of the military during their entire professional lives . Bundeswehr
commanders opened the installations for visits of civilians, and they visited
mayors, pastors, priests, school principals, and other prominent citizens of the
towns in an attempt to establish the sort of contact and support they enjoyed, at
least to some extent, in the old states. They had public swearing-in ceremonies
for the new conscripts and recruits and invited their families and the public.
One local commander worked with his local chamber of commerce to set up
retraining activities for his soldiers and find them jobs in the civilian economy
97
as they left the military .
As money began to flow in to upgrade barracks and other facilities, contracts
went to local finns, providing jobs in the local economies. Although not usually
considered part of the Bundeswehr's purview, where NVA installations had
provided services to communities, that agreement continued for the time being.

This included providing heat to homes from central boilers on the installation,
running athletic halls and swimming poo l s, and even stationing units in areas
where the economy had been dependent on the NYA units previously stationed
98

there, whether or not there was an operational need to do 50.

This public relations work was generally well received. The swearing-in
ceremonies were well attended, school children visited open houses hosted by
the soldiers, and the Catholic church in the new states contracted to provide a
ministry for soldiers in the installations, which is how the Bundeswehr has
traditionally managed such care, rather than having a military chaplains' corps.
The Protestant Church, however, has yet to agree to provide fonnal, pastoral
support in the installations. Despite repeated attempts by local commanders as
well as the Commander, Bundeswehr, East to bring the pastors into the military
community, they have remained at ann 's length. This attitude is not difficult to
understand, since the Protestant clergy were among the leaders of the opposition
to the GDR throughout its existence. As one pastor told General Schoenbohm,
"You know, I have spent my entire professional life fighting the state; my family
had to pay bitterly for this . . . and now all of a sudden I should work for a state,
99
that I don 't even know . . . you must understand, we need time.,, This is an
unfortunate, if understandable, attitude, and one can only hope that the clergy 's
opinion of the military will change through experience with the Bundeswehr,
and that this will be the case as well with the rest of the popUlation in the new
loo
states.

As far as draftees were concerned, little could be done with soldiers con
scripted in January and May of 1 990, but those conscripted by the GDR in
September were to receive basic training to Bundeswehr standard. It was
impossible for officers and noncommissioned officers of the old NY A to carry
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out this training effectively, so the units relied heavily on their sister units in
the West for teams of trainers, especially noncommissioned officers, to support
this training. The first soldiers conscripted by the Bundeswehr in the East, called
up in January 1 99 1 , all received their training in the West, thus raising the
training standard and giving them a chance to meet soldiers in the old states.
This changed rapidly so that while in the first quarter of 1 99 1 , 75 percent of the
soldiers from the new states were trained in the West, by the third quarter the
number was down to 49 percent and dropping, as training standards rose and
101
more equipment became available for training in the East.
B y mid- 1 992 a mixed training unit o f 2 18 soldiers, 60 percent from the new
states, 40 percent from the old, was fo nned at an old NYA air force installation
at Dietersdorf in Saxony-Anhalt. The basic and advanced individual training
provided was considered successful, especially in terms of the ties of com
\02
radeship built among the young soldiers.
Combining Eastern and Western
soldiers in this one training unit may have been done because of a concern about
the Bundeswehr in the East 's becoming a somewhat separate and second-class
army in an armed force in which draftees would usually serve near home and
have no opportunity to meet soldiers from somewhere else. Time will tell
whether this was no more than just an experiment or is an answer to such a
problem, but once the leadership personnel and equipment were available to
the Bundeswehr in the new states, the training standards there rose quickly, and
the conscript soldiers had experiences comparable to those of the soldiers in the
West, such as training at the center at Shilo, Canada.
For the officers of the old NYA, 1 992 was a difficult year. The two-year
probation period would come to an end , and for those who wished to stay, the
officer efficiency report they would receive from their commanders , any
academic reports they received from Bundeswehr schools attended, and finally
the decision of an independent, citizens ' screening board would be key to their
future careers. Commanders must have had a difficult time making recommen
dations. The officers were often away from the unit at training courses or in
training with the sister units in the West; there were often two or three officers
in one duty position, which made it difficult to know what they could do on
their own and which also led to a great deal of one-upmanship among the
officers being rated; and it was impossible to detennine who was really trying
to come to terms with the new circumstances and what it meant to lead in an
army in a democracy, and who was merely being opportunistic. Eventually,
approximately 3 ,000 officers , usually younger, lower-ranking officers , were
selected for career or long-term (six to twelve years) service. When one
considers that 32,000 officers had still been serving with the NYA on 3 October
103
1990, this action amounted to a purge of the NYA officer corps.
That any
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officers were accepted, given the problems of downsizing the forces and the
political baggage these officers brought with them, is a credit to the leadership
of the Bundeswehr and its belief in the effectiveness of Innere Fuehrung in
attacking the problematic legacy of the GDR and the NVA.
Whether this faith is justified may still be an open question. Certainly Innere

Fuehrung had special strengths which favored its use as a tool in this mission.
First and foremost it attacked the broken relationship between leader and led in
the NVA, which reflected broken human relations in the society of the GDR as
a whole. By treating the soldier as an individual with dignity and rights as well
as responsibilities, Innere Fuehrung forced officers and noncommissioned
officers to try to understand and empathize with their troops . That difficulty in
dealing with people, along with an understandable problem of grasping the
soldier's responsibilities vis-a-vis a democratic state, were the two biggest
hurdles the remnant of the NVA in the Bundeswehr had to overcome, and the
concepts of Innere Fuehrung dealt specifically with them. 1 04
Coming t o grips with the principles o f Innere Fuehrung also forced those
who remained to confront their past and their role in supporting the SED regime.

In doing this, they did not always receive the support they should have expected
from the soldiers of the old Bundeswehr, many of whom were very judgmental
of their Eastern counterparts and boorish in dealing with them. But the overall
extent of the Westerners' openness and willingness to work together usually
became evident to the more perceptive officers of the old NVA when they
considered what they would have done had history taken a different turn and
105
the NVA had taken over the Bundeswehr

Innere Fuehrung's greatest strength may well be that it has become a central
tenet of the Bundeswehr's world view and permeates so many aspects of its
training and activities. Thus, if the classes were boring or not understood, one
could still come to an understanding-through the actions of soldiers of the old
Bundeswehr-of what it meant to serve in an army in a democracy. There were
many examples of mere time-serving and arrogance among the officers and
noncommissioned officers of the Bundeswehr who served in the new states,
and this was certainly true when more than just volunteers were required, but
by and large the principles of Innere Fuehrung were probably taught more
effectively by example than through class room instruction.
The Bundeswehr still faces problems in the new states, some that concern
the tenets of Innere Fuehrung and some that threaten the very acceptance of
these tenets by soldiers in the East, whether they are from the old NVA or are
new conscripts or recruits. From its very inception in the 1950s, a central tenet
of Innere Fuehrung has been that the only acceptable traditions for the Bun
deswehr are those that support the ideals of an army in a democracy and that
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even soldierly virtues of bravery and loyalty have little meaning separate from
the aims for which soldiers fight. Thus, in his letter of instruction of 24
September 1990 concerning the establishment of unified Gennan anned forces,
the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr wrote that as the NV A had been, until 9
November 1 989, an "Anny of the Party and instrument of a dictatorship," it
would cease to exist and . . . "Symbols, unifonns, and traditions of the NV A
106

will not be transferred" to the Bundeswehr.

The problem, as the Bundeswehr found in relation to the Reichswehr and
Wehnn acht, is that traditions do not die that easily ; many who served in the
NV A, whether they are still in the Bundeswehr or are now in the civilian world,

feel that they served honorably in defense of their land and had certain virtues
which it would behoove the Bundeswehr to acknowledge. They have disdain
for what they perceive to be the Bundeswehr's nine-to-five attitude toward duty ,
and indeed, during the logistical support for the U.S. deployment to Saudi
Arabia, young fonner NVA officers often demonstrated greater willingness to
endure long hours and hardship than did some officers of the old Bundes
1 7
wehr. 0 This sort of professionalism may be a quality that an anny like the
Bundeswehr, which has been criticized for being too "occupational" in its
outlook and too closely tied to civilian society, should not dismiss out of hand.
Perhaps the right attitude here is General von Kirchbach 's view that while
the NV A's forty-year existence does not constitute tradition, it is part of Gennan
history and should not be ignored. Indeed, as the experience of the GDR proved,
to ignore portions of history merely because they are uncomfortable or do not
fit into a preconceived story is very dangerous . As von Kirchbach notes, the
NVA was a very professional and competent anny, at least in some areas, with

experience in assistance to the civilian sector that included industrial production
in the last years of the GDR, and these facts should be recognized as positive
1 8
achievements in Gennan military history . 0
In recognizing these positive aspects, however, the Bundeswehr must steer
clear of encouraging a tendency for NVA veterans to deny complicity in the
SED regime. Some of them are attempting to rationalize their previous actions
in the light of infonnation now available to them. Thus, after an initial shock
that their high readiness rate seemed to be for nothing , some veterans are now
arguing that since the NVA was essentially a defensive anny, it had to remain
constantly on guard against a Bundeswehr which could afford to take weekends
and holidays off because, as the aggressor, it could pick the time and place of
1OO
its attack.
This sort of argument and other myths, including those concerning
the reasons for the NV A' s lack of action during the Turning Point, must be met
with the hard truth both within the anned forces and in the public. This complex
of problems, however, falls well within the competencies Innere Fuehrung has
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encouraged in the anned forces, and questions of denial and tradition have been
previously dealt with in the Bundeswehr's short history. More intractable,
because not amenable to solution by the military alone, is the problem of
second-class citizenship and the reSUlting danger of an ann y within an anny .

Second-class citizenship, the feeling that one is being treated shabbily in
one 's own country, has been prevalent throughout the new states. Once the
euphoria induced by unification wore off, East Gennans began to feel they were
being annexed by the West and that their worth as people was being attacked.
High unemployment rates and the failure of Bonn to deliver on what had seemed
to be a promise of instant prosperity, along with the arrogance and lack of
empathy of many West Gennans, including members of the Bundeswehr, have
caused some East Gennans to overlook the progress that is being made and to
long for a security lost with the fall of the GDR. Within the Bundeswehr, these

feelings were aggravated by a differential in pay between Bundeswehr East and
West, and by what was perceived to be a poor pension plan for NVA retirees.
The pay for conscripts became unifonn in July 199 1 and is becoming equitable
for the officers and noncommissioned officers. However, pay , poor facilities,

and career uncertainties led to many complaints to the parliamentary om
l O
budsman, l and continued perceived inequities could play into the hands of

NVA veterans who have their own agendas.
Many of these veterans are members of the Bundeswehr professional as
sociation, the Association of the Gennan Anned Forces (Verband der
Deutschen Bundeswehr), based on their short service as Bundeswehr soldiers
in the months following unification. NV A officers who have left the service are
still living in housing areas with active-duty fonner NVA officers, because there
is nowhere else for them to go . Retired senior NV A officers are still in contact
with their past subordinates, and very senior officers (i.e. , generals and ad
mirals) are essentially unreconstructed in their attitudes.

III

Although powerless

now and probably more interested in pay and pension issues than anything else,
they could still become a force to be reckoned with should the Bundeswehr in
the new states become ingrown and provincial.

In his present position as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Army ,
Brigadier General von Kirchbach does not believe this will happen to the new
states. In April 1993, the first two hundred officers from the new states were
transferred to duty in the old states, and nonnal rotations between old and new
states will prevent the Bundeswehr in the East from becoming an anny within
an anny. Newly commissioned officers from the new states attended basic
courses in the West in 1993, as well, and in 1994 Eastern officers began

attending staff officer courses. I l 2 There are still problems with housing for
officers going in both directions: in the West housing is difficult to fmd and it
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is expensive; in the East it is substandard or non-existent. The problem,
however, may not be with the officers but with the noncommissioned officers
who do not move very much from duty station to duty station in the Bundes
wehr, and the conscripts, who generally serve close to home. The distinct
possibility that the Bundeswehr may become a volunteer army in the near future
could obviate the problem, if volunteers are forced to move, it could, however,
make the problem worse if the present policy of seldom moving noncommis
sioned officers and soldiers continues, because as volunteers, soldiers will be
serving longer terms than would conscripts and might not move at all during
1 13
their enlistments.
Innere Fuehrung does not directly address economic difficulties and feelings
of second-class citizenship, or the danger that part of a nation, and thus part of
its armed forces, could become a backwater ripe for reactionary propaganda.

In fact, Baudissin pointed out under similar circumstances in 1 956 that soldiers
who have problems with pay, facilities, and benefits are going to have difficulty
1 14
dealing with the higher concepts of Innere Fuehrung.
The Bundeswehr
leadership, however, found imaginative solutions to at least some of these
problems. Soldiers from the new states who were sent on the United Nations
mission to Cambodia, for example, were brought to the old states en route to
Cambodia, making them eligible for comparable pay because soldiers from the
East, when stationed in the old states, receive the same pay as their Western
counterparts. There is some evidence of a sort of unofficial affirmative action
program for soldiers from the new states, and if anything, these soldiers may
be given the benefit of the doubt to ensure success in their new careers.

lIS

That

the building of the Bundeswehr in the new states is regarded as a great peacetime
challenge, and that it will be career-enhancing for a Western officer who
1 16
in the East, should continue to attract officers of high quality from the

serves

old states to the new.
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New Missions for Innere Fuehrung
PROBLEMS JUST OUTLINED pale in comparison to the civil-military

challenges in countries to the east of Gennany . The countries of the

Warsaw Pact, including those in Central and Eastern Europe and of the old
Soviet Union, have all approached the Bundeswehr for infonnation about
civil-military relations in a democracy . Over two hundred officers from the old
Warsaw Pact countries have already attended courses at the Center for Innere
Fuehrung in Koblenz, and the Center has a two-year memoranda of agreement
with the defense establishments of these countries to provide a variety of
courses, seminars, and familiarization visits on the theme of "The Soldier and
the Anned Forces in and for Democracy." These countries have approached
the Bundeswehr because of its proximity and, in the case of countries like
Hungary, historical ties. The Bundeswehr is also a conscript anny like theirs
and has had immediate experience in dealing with a socialist anny, the NV A,
with similar organization, ethos, and problems.
Yet another reason given for interest in the Bundeswehr and Innere Fueh
rung is the belief that the Bundeswehr is an example, perhaps the only example,
of an anny successfully growing out of totalitarianism and into the service of
a democratic society. This is not true, however, because as we have seen, the
Bundeswehr came into existence a decade after the fall of the Third Reich, and
even so, its birth as an anny in a democracy was difficult enough. Whether the
anned forces of the old Warsaw Pact can make the transition, especially facing

problems such as the breakup of their countries and the need for soldiers to
decide which state they will serve, is yet to be seen.

I I?

Given the failure of the

NVA to refonn itself with its old leadership still in place, the prospects are
doubtful. Perhaps the best one can hope for is that the need to reduce radically
their militaries for budgetary reasons will act to some extent as a purge of the

did guard in these countries.
The United States is also assisting in the endeavor to establish proper
civil-military relations in these countries, and an understanding of Innere
Fuehrung in addition to our own traditions of civilian supremacy could only

enhance these efforts. Moreover, the anned forces of the United States should
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not be so smug as to believe they have nothing to learn in this area. A recent
award-winning article in Parameters indicated that perhaps in light of the armed
forces ' changing relationship to civilian authority and growing isolation from
the mainstream of American society, greater emphasis should be placed on the
1 18
sort of training Innere Fuehrung has always stressed in the Bundeswehr.
The principles of Innere Fuehrung were born in a difficult time, proved
themselves in the old Bundeswehr against hard challenges in every decade
leading to unification, and, if not the complete answer to the needs of the
Bundeswehr in the new states, they have certainly provided a compass for the
first soldiers who went East after 2 October 1 990. It has also been a basis upon
which soldiers from the new states, whether former NVA or new recruits, can
build their understanding of the meaning of their service and their relation to
their society . Besides the challenges it now faces in the new states, the
Bundeswehr and its guiding principles are confronted by major new challenges.
With the waning of the Cold War and the inception of a dangerous and
unknown new world, the Bundeswehr faces the challenge of preparing itself
for missions outside the traditional framework of NATO. Whether the principles
of Innere Fuehrung can be translated to cover the exigencies of out-of-sector
missions may be open to debate, but the underlying principle that the soldier is
a thinking individual who must understand the "why" even more than the "how"
of what is asked of him is leading to discuss ion within the Bundeswehr, as well
as the public, of what should in fact be asked of him. In the public this is being
reflected in a record number of conscientious objectors, which peaked during
the Gulf War. This negative response among young Germans called into
question the basis for the Bundeswehr's personnel planning, even before it
became evident that the armed forces will sink well below the ceiling of 370,000
troops agreed upon between Chancellor Kohl and Premier Gorbachev, raising
1 19
the spectre of a volunteer force.
If the Bundeswehr does become a volunteer army, the concepts of Innere
Fuehrung will more than ever have to tie the soldier to his society, because the
link of universal military service, which bound the soldier and civil society
together, will have been broken. The idea of universal service, dating back to
the Prussian reformers of the Wars of Liberation, according to which all
able-bodied male citizens served their nation through a term in the military, has
become more of a myth in recent years, as fewer soldiers have been needed to
fill the ranks, but it remains an important myth in a society seeking to avoid the
creation of a military caste. Whether soldiers are recruited or conscripted, if the
leadership of the Bundeswehr is to retain the fragile support of the German
people, it will have to explain clearly and compellingly the need for a military
to protect the interests of a sovereign state, even when those interests lie beyond
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its borders. If the Bundeswehr can meet these challenges, it will in no small part

be due to the concepts of an army in a democracy enunciated in the principles
of Innere Fuehrung and used so effectively in its mission in the East.
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has been a continuous upward trend for about three decades." Hans Rattinger, " Change
versus Continuity in West German Public Attitudes on National Security and Nuclear
Weapons in the Early 1 980's , " Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 5 1 , no. 4, Wi nter 1 987, p. 500.
See also Figure 3 , p . 502.
18. See for instance General Heinz Karst comments in Klaus Hornung, " Streitkraefte
in Demokratien : zum Verhaeltnis von Militaer und Poli tik , " in Kaeber a nd Tripp, pp. 3� 1 .
See also Hornung's own comments, pp. 29-30.
1 9 . Harry Summers, "Humanitarian Mission Could Si gnal Collapse of Fighting Spirit, "
A nny Times, 1 4 December 1 992, p . 35.
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20. Bernhard Fleckenstein, " Federal Republic of Germany , " in Charles C . Moskos and
Frank R. Wood, The Military--More ThanJus t aJob ? (Washington, D . C . : Pergamon-B rassey,
1 988) , pp . 1 77-90 .
2 1 . Thompson and Peltier, p . 598.
22. Fleckenstein, p . 1 88 .
2 3 . Thompson and Peltier, pp. 596-7 .
2 4 . Zoll, pp. 2 2 1 -2 , 227 .
2 5 . D iscussion with Colonel Rieck, Director, D ivision 2, Ce nter for In nere Fueh rung,
Koblenz, 19 January 1 993. Colonel Rieck was Deputy Commander, 42d Home Defense
Brigade, headquartered in Potsdam, from J anuary 1 991 to Oc tober 1 992. The 42d was
formed from the remnants of the NV A's 1 s t Motorized Rifl e Division , whose mission i n
wartime had b e e n t o c u t off the western approaches t o Berlin.
26. Siegfried Grimm,
. . der Bundes republik treu zu dienen: Die geistige Ruestung der
Bundeswehr (Duesseldorf: D roste Verlag, 1 970) , pp. 1 20--5 .
2 7 . D iscussion with Colonel Dieter Francke, Director, Division 3, Center for Innere
Fueh rung, Koblenz, 1 8-1 9 January 1 99 3 . C olonel Francke, who leads the Ce nter's division
responsible for political education, believes this to be the case .
28. Articles 45b, 87a & b, 96(2) , & 1 1 5a & b, Basic LAwfor the Federal Republic of Gennany.
29. Abenheim cites a number of examples of actions and words of military and political
leaders raising fears of the military' s falling back into the old ways. One of the more famous
instances was the comment of the Deputy C hief of Staff of the A rmy, Major General Hans
Hellmuth Grashey, in March 1 969 to the effect that Innere Fueh rung had only been a " mask"
to sell the military to the leadership of the Social Democrati c Party and P rotesta nt church .
(Abenheim, pp . 50, 242) . See also the 1 964 comments of Parliamentary Ombudsman
Hellmuth Heye : "The trend towards a state within a state is unmistakable . " (Quoted in
Abenheim, p . 203) . More recently Lieutenant General Werner von Scheven's official
condemnation of an innocuous exhibition about the pacifist author Kurt Tucholsky in
Rheinsberg, Brandenburg, as a " relic of the anti-capitalist battle" opened the Commander
of the Corps and Territorial Command, East (the army command in the new states) to
criticism that he is trampling on civil rights. ("Zensor mit drei Steme n , " Der Spiegel, vol. 46,
issue 42, 1 2 October 1 992, p. 1 50.) The Spiegel a rticle about this incident is a good example
of h ow the German press deals with these kinds of stories: the general is referred to as
"aristocratic," and the article mentions that he was formerly responsible fo r Innere Fuehrung
training in the West. See also, the Spiegel's reaction to proposals to set up a j oint command
structure as "The Megalomania of the Generals" (Groessenwahn der Generaele) , Der Spiegel,
vol. 46, issue 1 5 , 6 April 1 992, pp. 1 8-2 1 .
30 . Dietmar Schoessler, " P hasen der NVA-Geschichte," in Erbe N VA-Eindruecke
aus ihrer Geschich te u nd den Tagen der Wende, eds. Volke r Koop and Dietmar Schoessler
(Wal dbroel: Akademie der B undeswehr fuer I nformation und Kommunikation , 1 992) , p p .
259--6 4 . T h e sta ndard work i n English about the history a n d organization of t h e N VA has
been Thomas M. Forster, The East Gennan Anny: The Second Power in the Warsaw Pact
(London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd . , 1 980) . Portions of the book are now dated by
infonnation available following union, but the leadersh ip of the NVA itself considered
Forester to be largely correct. See Manfred Backerra , ed . , NVA-Ein Rueckblick foer die
ZukunJt: Zeitzeugen bench ten ueber ein Stueck deutscher Militaergeschich te (Cologne : Markus
Verlag, 1 992) , p. 1 7 .
3 1 . Forster, p . 5 1 .
3 2 . Ibid.
3 3 . Forster, pp. 236-7 ; Abenheim, p. 1 53. See also Wilfried Hanisch, " I n der Tradition
von Muentzer, Scharnhorst, E ngels und Thalmann?" in Backerra, pp. 255-68.
34. Peter Lange, "Ab Oktober wird es keine NVA mehr gebe n , " Truppenpraxis, no. 5 ,
September-October 1 990, p . 436 .
3 5 . For one example among many, see Joerg Schoenbohm, Zwei A nneen und ein
Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksannee (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1 992) , pp. 87-8 .
36 . Hans Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt , Abenteuer Einheit:
Zum A uJbau der Bundeswehr in den Neuen LAendem (Frankfurt am Main: Report Verlag, 1 992) ,
p. 73.
37 . Quoted i n Forster, p . 2 7 6 .
.
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3 8 . For examples of this sort of material, see Schoenbohm, p. 79; Dietri ch W .
Streitparth, " D as E thos der B u ndeswe h r wird ve rletzt," Fra nkfu rter A llgemeine Zeitung,
1 7 August 1 990; and J oachim Nawrocki , "Jeder Tatbestand hat ein Gesicht," Das Parlament,
1 1 September 1 992.
39. Koop and Schoessler, pp. 20-4. Also, discussion with Lieutenant Colonel B ernhard
Ickenroth , Center for Innere Fuehru rlg, Koble nz, 1 9 January 1 99 3 . LTC Ickenroth had the
duty of closing d own the NVA's school for political officers, the Wilhelm Pieck Institute,
B erlin . The ins titute had both a Stresskabinett and a Feindbildkabinett.
40. This argument was advanced to me by Mr. Frithj o fKnabe in a discussion in Leipzig,
21 January 1 99 3 . Mr. Knabe was formerly a political officer on the staff of the NV A's M ilitary
District III with headquarters i n Leipzig, whose maj o r units were two motorized infantry
and one armored division in the southern part of the GDR (Forester, p . 1 1 6) .
4 1 . Guenther Poeschel, " Seefahrt macht frei ! Leider nicht immer . . . . : Ueber die
Volksmarine der NVA, " in B ackerra, pp. 1 6 1-2.
42. Von Scheve n, p . 1 65 .
43 . The 9 8 percent figure i s from Klaus-Juergen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb,
"Wer bist D u-Kamerad, " Truppenpraxis, no. 6, November-De cember 1 990, p . 65 1 . A
lower Party membe rs hip rate of 96 percent for officers is p rovided by Ruediger Volk and
Torsten Squarr, "Zum Inneren Zustand der NV A," in Ein Staat-Eine A nnee: Von der NVA
zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick ( F rankfu rt am Main: Report Verlag, 1 992) , p. 236.
According to the authors the tact that 100 percent of the officers were not party members
may have been due to officers' waiting for membership---t he alibi function of some to show
one did not have to be a member of the party to be an officer, or the desire to be able to
show an increase of members i n later years. Volk and Squarr's total officer strength includes
" Faehnriche, " a sort of ensign rank which does not have an equivalent in Western armed
forces and which draws its population from the noncommissioned officers . The compara
tively low percentage of noncommissioned officers reflects their unimporta nce in the NVA
leadership structu re . Noncommi ssioned officers in the NVA were tec hnicians and specialists ,
not the leaders found in Western armies. Only about 1 1 percent of the enlisted soldiers were
party members. These percentages are also from Volk and Squarr.
44. Koop and Schoessler, pp. 69-7 2.
45 . Herbert Koenig, "B ericht aus einer anderen Welt, " Truppenpraxis, No . 3 , May-June
1 992, pp . 23 5 -6 .
4 6 . See F o re s t e r , p . 1 6 5 fo r a d i a g r a m of t h e p a r ty s t r u c t u r e i n the m i l i t a ry a n d
p p . 1 67-70 for a discussio n of the SED's and F ree German Youth Association's activities .
47 . See, for instance, Colonel Karl-Heinz Marschner's reminisces in Farwick, pp . 206 ff.
48. Koenig, p. 235.
49 . A company with at least one hundred soldiers would have one political officer; at
battalion level there were two; at the regiment there were four to six; and at division level
there were fourteen to sixteen. At still higher headquarte rs there would be stafiS of forty-five
to fifty officers, and in the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of National Defense,
the table of organizatio n called for ten generals , eighty-eight colonels, and seventy-one other
officers, along with one hundred twenty enlisted and civilian workers . There were also many
political office rs who were involved in research, education, and editing a nd publishing the
various publications dealing with political training, and assigned to cultural institutions,
including some outside the armed forces . Kurt Held, Heinz Friedrich, and Dagmar Pietsch,
" Politische Bi/dung u fJd Erzieh ung in der Nationalen Volksa nnee, " in Backerra, p. 209.
50. Discussions with F rancke, Knabe, and Lieutenant Colonel Klaus-J uergen E ngelien,
Executive Officer, Division 3 , Cente r for Innere Fuehrung.
5 1 . For an expression of the former position, see the views of forme r NVA officers i n
Engelien a n d Reeb , p . 65 1 . Mr. Knabe , having been a political officer, argues of c o u rs e , for
the latter view and believes he himself was co-opted into the ranks of the political officers
for having asked some difficult questions . LTC E ngelien's correspondence file for the period
between the fall of the Wall and the unification of the Germanys co ntains numerous letters
from political officers seeking assistance in p reparing traini ng for armed services in a
democracy. See also, Held, Friedrich, and Pietsch in B ackerra, p. 2 1 5 .
52. Discussion with B rigadier General Hans Peter von Kirchbach , FueH I, 1 , Bm Vg,
Bonn, 1 9 January 1 993.
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5 3 . Typically , the regimental commander had from 80,000 to 250,000 marks to give
to his troops as bonuses for outstanding duty performance, to include political activities.
Awards could be cash or consumer products not normally available on the civilian market,
like power tools or coffee services, and they could be given more than once a year. In
twenty-six years of service, one officer received fifty-three such awards, another received
ninety-three awards in thirty-one years of service , and a third received one hundred fourteen
awards and bonuses in thirty-four years of service. Schoenbohm, p . 1 30 .
54. Guenter v o n Steinaecker, Studie z u m Thema: Nationale Volharmee und Wanchauer
Pakt in der schrijtlichen und gegenstaendlichen historischen Dantellung und ihre Bedeutungfuer die
Traditionspjlege det' Bundeswehr (Strausberg: Bundeswehrkommando Ost, 21 February 1 99 1 ) .
This i s an internal Bundeswehr study conducted b y Brigadier General Doctor von Steinaeck
er, with an interesting addendum by his wife concerning her impressions of life in the NVA
from conversations with the wives of former-NVA officers . See this addendum, p. 2. On
the subject of pay, for instance, an average salary for a lieute nant colonel before bonuses and
awards were added was about 1 ,800 marks per month . Someone in a comparable civilian
position would have received approximately 900 marks.
5 5 . LTC Engelien tells the story of an NVA officer acquaintance who religiously
followed the ban but was contacted by his children's teacher who indicated that they must
be watching Western television because they talked about the programs at school. He found
they were watching television at a neighbor's apartment and had to explain to them why it
was important that they not watch. Such discoveries did not always happen accidentally. In
some kindergartens children were shown postcards of popular Western cartoon characters
to see who could recognize them and thus indicate that they were watching Western
programs at home . See "Die Armee die dabeistand," Frankfu rter Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 263 ,
10 November 1 990. Pe rsonal security measures for watching Western TV in housing areas
monitored by State Security and political officers, according to former-NVA Colonel
Hans-Werner Weber, included always turning off the television before answering the
doorbell and, when turni ng the television off, moving the dial to a GDR channel. See
Backerra, p . 5 1 .
These stories illustrate the scrutiny one came under i n all areas o f life and the need, as
Mr. Knabe puts it, to wear two faces in the GDR: a private one in the family and around
only the most trusted friends , and a public one, which conformed to what society expected
of one. This ability has troubling aspects for j udging the sincerity of former NVA officers'
conversion to the principles of Innere Fuehrung.
56. Brigadier Ge neral von Kirchbach indicated that up to 20 percent of these officers
might have to be released from service because of the Gauck commission findings. Some
branches, like signal , had appreciably more Stasi informers than others. All officers were
required to cooperate with the Stasi. The ones who are being released from service are those
who signed agreements to be informers.
57. Discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Engelien.
58. The high readiness rate and its effect on the morale of soldiers and officers is
mentioned in most of the literature on the NVA and comes up in practically all discussions
about it. See, for instance, Schoenbohm, p. 203; von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, p. 20;
and Koenig, pp. 236-7 .
59. Discussion with Mr. Knabe.
60. Nawrocki. See also, Weber in Backerra, p . 59.
6 1 . Mr. Knabe points out that units had been ordered to their barracks and had only
the information provided by the state . They tended to believe that the demonstrators were
hooligans and probably would have followed orders until they realized their mistake . His
own wife and children were on the streets of Leipzig trying to find out what was happening,
while he was receiving misinformation in the barracks. Former-NVA Colonel Weber feels
the NVA did not react because events came too quiclcly and that by November 1 989 the
armed forces were themselves disorganized and impossible to lead. See Weber in Backerra,
p. 6 1 . For an opposite view, see the remarks of former-NVA Major General Bernd Leistner
in " Sie im Westen wussten mehr ueber uns al wir, " Die Welt, no. 222, 22 September 1 990,
p. 5 .
62. "Zur Traditionsptlege in der Nationalen Volksarmee , " Militameform in der DDR,
no. 24, 12 July 1 990, p. 3 .
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63. "Rahmenrichtlinie ueber dienstliche und ausserdie nstliche Kontakte zwischen
50ldaten der Bu ndeswehr und Angehoerigen der Nationialen Volksannee," Militaerreform in
der DDR, no. 20, 7 Tune 1 990, p . 1 .
64. Von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, pp. 1 7-22.
65. D iscussions with Colonel Francke, Lieute nant Colonel Engelien, and Mr. Knabe.
Citizens' initiatives were the means used to attack inj ustices and problems during the Turning
Point, and one could organize and register an initiative with the authorities if seven people
were willi n g to support whatever the initiative wished to promote. It is instructive that Knabe
had to find two non-military members for his initiative, because he could only find four out
of a staff offifty political officers who wished to go on record in support of refonns. According
to Knabe, older officers were too involved with the system to have any reason to wish to
change it, and many younger officers did not understand what was happening or wish to get
involved.
66. Weber in B ackerra, pp . 62--6.
67 . Rupert Scholz, "D eutsche Frage u nd Europaeische Sicherhei t," Europa-Arc:hiv,
Folge 7 , 1 0 April 1 990, p. 245 .
68. The speech is quoted in its entirety in Militaerreform in der DDR, no. 1 7 , May 1990.
69. In J uly 1 990 Eppelmannn made a statement to that effect to the Japanese press,
noted in " General Schoenbohm will nicht Eppelmanns Nachfolger sein," Frankfurter
A llgemeine Zeitung, 28 September 1 990 . On 2 August he made a similar statement while on
a visit to Bonn. See Donald Abenheim, German Unity and the Soldier: Problems of Command,
Personnel, and the Stalinist Legacy, unpublished manuscript, pp. 29-30.
70. "Ein Truemmerhaufen der Gefuehle , " Der Spiegel, vol. 44, issue 1 0 , 5 March 1 990,
pp. 37 , 45 .
7 1 . Q uoted in Christoph Bertram, " Kommt die allgemei ne Diens tpflicht?" A ktuell,
vol. 28, no. 79, 1 5 O ctober 1 992, p. 3 .
7 2 . Marschner in von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, p p . 50-4.
73 . Von Scheven, p. 1 67 .
7 4 . Horst Teltschik, 3 2 9 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin : Siedler Verlag, 1 99 1 ) ,
pp . 323-4, and 334-8. See also Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unijication
(Washington, D . C . : The Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. , 1 993 ) , pp. 221-3.
75. Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, p . 76.
76. Schoenbohm, pp. 30-2. Having completed its initial transition mission, Bundes
wehr Command, East stood down on 1 July 1 99 1 and was replaced by separate service
headquarters. Despite the fact that the B undeswehr is considered a single entity, the
Bundeswehr Command, East was its first experiment with a j oint headquarters in command
of all three service components.
77. Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard Ickenroth, for instance, single-handedly took com
mand of the Wilhelm Pieck I nstitute in Berlin, which had a complement of eighty instructors
and 572 students, and stood it down 21 D ecember 1 990 . The old commandant, who was
still on hand, and his staff, were uncooperative, and Ickenroth had to discover by himself
such things as fonner Stasi operatives working as drivers, mechanics, and electricians for the
institute and listening devices in the classrooms and his own office. For the origi nal number
of officers posted to the new states and where they went, see Edgar Trost, " P robleme der
Personalauswahl , " in Farwick, pp. 1 7 6-80.
78. Trost in Farwick, pp. 1 76-80.
79. See for instance Lieutenant Colonel Manfred Meyers, "Umgeplant" in von
Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, pp. 27-30, and Major General Edgar Trost in Farwick, p. 1 7 1 .
80. See for instance Dietrich W. Streitparth, "Das Ethos der Bundeswehr wird verletzt, "
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 7 August 1 990 . This agreed with an earlier article by Guenther
Gill e ssen, the tide of which summed up the position of those who felt there was no middle
ground between the B undeswehr and the NVA: "Disband--w ithout a Remnant" (Auf]oesen
ohne Rest) , Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 July 1 990) .
8 1 . Hannut Neumann, "Maerkische Heide, maerkischer Sand," part 1 , Truppenpraxis,
no. 1 , January-February 1 992, p. 56. See also, Schoenbohm, pp. 62 and 87 and von
Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, pp . 92-7 , 1 1 5 .
82. Christian Millotat, "Man ist sich fremd, " Truppenpraxis, no. 5, September-October
1 992, pp. 492 ff. English translation provided by Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, Strategi c Studies
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Institute. U.S. Anny War College. Truppenpraxis. No. 1 . January-February 1 993 had five
pages of letters concerning the article. a number accusing Colonel Millotat of broad
generalizations. lack of soldierly discretion. and of making the process of building an "anny
of unity" more difficult.
83. Hannut Neumann. "Maerkische Heide . maerkischer Sand . " part 2 . Truppenpraxis.
no . 2. March-April. 1992. pp. 1 65--6. See also. von Kirchbach. Meyers. and Vogt. p. 8 1 .
84. Millotat and Francke believe it was not; Neumann describes the "stopwatch"
mind-set he found when he took command of the 3d Motorized Rifle Regiment in
Brandenburg (Part 2. p . 1 66) . Rieck felt that in some individual soldier skills. NVA soldiers
were both better trained and equipped than their Bundeswehr counterparts.
85. For other sources of friction. see von Kirchbach. Meyers. and Vogt. p. 69.
86. Some East Gennans believe that tigers do not change their stripes and that the
retention of NVA officers and noncommissioned officers in the Bundeswehr is another
example of the old cadres' retaining their positions of privilege in the new society . People .
whether military or civilian. who make the change from communist to democratic principles
too easily and quickly are tagged with the descriptive tenn " Wendehals, " as if. like the bird
of that name. they could turn their heads around 1 80 degrees on their necks. A Berlin j oke
runs: "Why do so many people wear turtlenecks? So you can't see the screw threads on their
necks" (quoted in Mrs. von Steinaecker's addendum to her husband's report. p . 5) . For an
example of how this attitude affects the B undeswe hr. see General Schoenbohrn's own
experience of being mistaken for a fonner-NVA officer (Sc hoenbohm. p. 1 38) . An
acquaintance in Auerbach. Saxony summed up the civilian attitude toward NVA officers:
"They were all Stasi" (discussion on 22 January 1 993) .
87. " Hans. das ist unsere Demokratie." Der Spiegel. vol. 44. issue 39. 24 September
1 990. pp . 86-90.
88. Discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Siegfried Frei. Gennan Army Liaison Officer
to the Combined Arms Support Command. Fort Lee. Virginia. 30 October 1 992.
89. Discussion with Colonel Francke.
90. Trost in Farwick. p . 1 94 .
91 . Von Kirchbach. Meyers. and Vo � . p. 1 1 8 .
9 2 . P rogram of I nstruction for ' E rgaenzungslehrgang I n nere F u e hrung mit
Stabsoffiziere." conducted at the Center for [nnere Fuehrung in Koblenz. 4- 1 5 November
1 99 1 .
93. Schoenbohm. pp. 1 36-7 .
94 . Aft e r Action Report for " E rg a e n z u ngslehrgang ' I nnere F u e hrung m i t
Stabsoffizier· . . . conducted at the Center for [nnere Fuehrung in Koblenz. 4- 1 5 November
1 991 .
95. Schoenbohm. pp. 33-4.
96. Discussion with Colonel Francke.
97. Schoenbohm. p . 1 7 8 .
9 8 . This argument can be made for stationing the 4 1 st Home Defense Brigade in Eggesin
in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. previously home of the 9th NVA Armored Division. The
anny is the largest employer in this economically depressed region. See Karl Feldrneyer.
"Truppenalltag in Eggesin. " Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 1 1 September 1 992
99. Quoted in Schoenbohm. p. 1 43. See also Lieutenant Colonel Ne umann's frustrating
attempts to provide pastoral services for his troops. and the opposition among the clergy.
especially female pastors. to any connection with the military. Neumann caustically concludes
that anyone who rej ects his profession so totally as does the Protestant clergy really has no
business being on his installation. Part 2. pp . 1 66-9.
1 00. See Chapter 7 . "Bevoelkerungsgruppen" in Hans-Viktor Hoffinan. Demoskopisches
Meinungsbild in Deutschland zur Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1 99 1 (Waldbruel: Akademie
der Bundeswehr fuer Information und Kommunikation. 1 992) . pp. 1 67-80. which argues
that on military and security topics the opinions of citizens in old and new states are very
close but that citizens in the new states have yet to understand the importance of security
questions for them and to understand the institutions of the Federal Republic. including the
Bundeswehr. As of 1 991 there were differences. however. For instance. 21 percent of East
Germans would have had Gennany leave NATO versus 10 percent of the West Gennans.
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Forty-six percent of East Gennans thought NATO was no longer important and 47 percent
thought European annies in general were no longer important. p. 1 79 .
1 0 1 . Koop and Schoessler, p. 3 1 1 .
1 02 . Volker Gruss, " Kameradschaftlich der Ve rei nigung e i n weiteres Stueck
naehrgekommen," AktueJl, vol. 29, issue 5 , 19 January 1 993, p. 3 . See also, Manfred Meyers,
"Ausbildung' " in von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vost, pp. 1 1 4-1 6 .
1 0 3 . This w as the tenn used by Dieter Det1ce, Executive Director o f the Friedrich Ebert
Institute in Washington D.C. at a seminar at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University, 1 March 1 993. The exact figures for the Anny (not including the Air Force or
Navy) are: 1 ,067 career commissioned officers, 598 career warrant officers, and 576 officers
with six to twelve-year commitments, for a total of 2,241 officers. This total is still subject
to become smaller if more evidence of Stasi connections are found. Discussion with Brigadier
General von Kirchbach.
1 04. Discussions with Brigadier General von Kirchbach and Colonel Francke .
105. Schoenbohm, p. 1 38 . Answers to the question range from NVA officers saying they
would not even have shaken hands with Bundeswehr officers to the problem of shaking
hands never coming up , because all the Bundeswehr officers would have been in p rison
camps. Discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Frei.
106. Quoted in Farwick, pp. 1 80-1 . The Ztntrale DiellSlschrijt 1 0 / 1 : Hiifenfuer die Innere
Fuehrung, the regulation providing guidance to the troops on Innere Fuehrung, is presently
under revision, but will almost certainly state that NVA traditions are u nacceptable to the
Bundeswehr.
107. Discussion with Mr. Knabe and Abenheim manuscript, German Unity and the Soldier,
p. 44.
108. Von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt. pp. 1 69-70. In his book. von Kirchbach goes
on to say that traditions of Bundeswehr units disbanded in the old states should not be
transferred to units in the new states. and that his own 4 1 st Home Defense B rigade should
remember that it was fonned out of the 9th NVA Annored Division, not out of love of
tradition but because it is history. In discussion he mentioned that he had kept equipment
from the 9th Division on hand, ignoring directives to turn it in, with the objective of
eventually establishing a unit museum. On the subj ect of NVA assistance in civilian
production, it should be noted that as the GDR's economy collapsed, more and more soldiers
were diverted from military duties to service in factories and mines, often doing work in
conditions too dangerous for civilian workers, until 5 5 ,000 soldiers were working in the
civilian economy. The units still had to remain at 85 percent readiness despite this loss of
manpower.
1 09. Discussion with Colonel Francke .
1 1 0. Holger Arnold, " Zu n eh mend sozialer Zu ends toJ! in der Truppe, " Neu e Zeit,
1 8 September 1 992.
1 1 1 . Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Frei , Lieutenant Colonel lckenroth, and Mr.
Knabe. In connection with his doctoral work at the University of Leipzig, Mr. Knabe
interviewed fifteen former-NVA generals and admirals. According to his findings the majority
of them had not changed their views and felt that socialism had only been incorrectly
implemented. Some of them also told him that they had considered a putsch at the time of
the Turning Point but had decided not to carry it out after the Soviet Forces in Germany
told them they would not support it and because they had no idea what they would do if
they took power. Concerning membership of fonner-NVA officers in the " Verband
Deutscher Bundeswehr," I found divided opinions among Bundeswehr officers. Some felt
that since they had served, even if only two or three months, they had a right to be there .
Others felt that membership gave them an air of respectability which they did not deserve.
1 1 2. Discussion with Brigadier Ge neral von Kirchbach.
1 1 3 . For discussion of the possibility of a volunteer Bundeswehr, see " Wehrpj1icht am
Ende?" Der Spiegel, vol. 47 , issue 6, 8 February 1 993, pp. 36 ff.
1 1 4. Abenheim. Reforging the Iron Cross, pp. 1 7 1-2.
1 1 5 . Discussion with Colonel Bernd Mueller, Anny Attache, German Embassy,
Washington D . C . , 1 8 December 1 992. In both his book and in discussion. B rigadier General
von Kirchbach makes no secret of the fact that he is a "booster" of the soldiers from the new
states, and takes every opportunity to present them in a favorable light. That he also
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understands the ongoing difficulties, which Innere Fuehrung must address, is evident in a speech
to the officers of the 41st Home Defense Brigade reprinted as "Offizier im Heer der Einheit, "
Truppenpraxis, n o . 4, July-August, 1 992.
1 1 6. Discussion with Colonel Rieck.
1 1 7 . Discussi on with Colonel Francke.
1 1 8. Charles J. Dunlap Jr. , "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 20 1 2, "
Parametm, vol. 22, no. 4, Winter 1992, pp. 1 0-1 1 , 1 5 .
1 1 9. "Gewehr unterm Baum, " Der Spiegel, vol. 4 7 , issue 2, 1 1 January 1993, p p . 34 ff.
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Glossary
Image of the Enemy

Feindbild

Association of the German Armed Forces

Verband der Deutschen
Bundeswehr

Bundeswehr

Armed Forces of the
Federal Republic of Germany

Citizen in Uniform

Staa.tsbuerger in Uniform

Civilian Control of the Military

Primat der Politik

Die Wende

Turning Point

du

Familiar form of "You"

EK

EntlassungsluJndidat

GDR

German Democratic Republic

Innere Fuehrung*

Inner Leadership

National People's Army

National Volksannee

NVA

Nationale Volksarmee

(candidate for discharge)

(NVA)

(National People's Army)

NCO

Noncommissioned Officer

Parliamentary ombudsman

Wehrbeauftragter

Primat der Politik

Civilian Control of the Military

Reichswehr

Imperial Army
(Term for the German Armed
Forces prior to

1935)

SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei

Socialist Unity Party

Staa.tsbuerger in Uniform

Citizen in Uniform

Deutschland)

The Newport Papers
Turning Point

Die Wende

Verband der Deutschen Bundeswehr

Association of the Gennan
Anned Forces

WehrbeauJtragter

Parliamentary ombudsman

Wehnnacht

World War n Gennan Anny

*See text referring to note

2

for Dr. Donald Abenheim's description of lnnere Fuehrung.
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